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WOLF v. COMMONWEALTH: THE STATE AND THE
PAYMENT OF INTEREST IN EMINENT DOMAIN
PROCEEDINGS
In the recent case of Wolf v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decided that the state's implied sovereign immunity from
paying interest on judgments2 must bow to an individual's constitutional
right to "just compensation" for the taking of his property.3 The court
ruled that the Commonwealth shall be treated in the same manner as all
other condemnors and shall be liable for interest on the amount of the con-
demnation award from the date of the determination of the award until
actual payment thereof. The court expressly overruled Culver v. Common-
wealth4 which had been the leading authority for the proposition that the
state was free from payment of such interest. The purpose of this Case
Note is to compare the bases of the Wolf decision with the considerations
which had, in the past, moved the courts to hold the Commonwealth immune
from the payment of interest in condemnation awards.
The facts of the Wolf case which are pertinent to this discussion are
as follows: on December 26, 1956, the Commonwealth, acting through the
Department of Forests and Waters, condemned for state park purposes
certain property owned by Robert Wolf. Real estate experts of the several
parties arrived at greatly divergent valuations.5 In April 1958, a board of
viewers awarded 415,800 dollars, an amount which included damages as
compensation for delay in payment. Wolf appealed therefrom to the court
of common pleas, alleging inadequacy of the award. On November 6, 1959,
after a trial de novo, the jury brought in a verdict of 355,000 dollars, which
amount included no allowance for detention damages. On February 17, 1960,
the trial judge entered judgment n.o.v. for Wolf in the amount of 421,917.50
dollars, 6 and provided that the judgment should bear interest at a rate of
1. 403 Pa. 499, 170 A.2d 557 (1961).
2. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; PA. CONST. art. 3, § 16.
3. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
4. 348 Pa. 472, 35 A.2d 64 (1944).
5. The state's experts valued the land at $350,000 and $355,000. Wolf's experts'
appraisals were $750,000 and $777,000. Record, p. Sla, Wolf v. Commonwealth, supra
note 1.
6. This amount was composed of $355,000 for the value of the property and
$66,917.50 as detention damages computed at 6% per annum from the date of the
taking to the date of judgment n.o.v.
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six per cent per annum from the date thereof to the date of satisfaction. 7 On
March 30, 1960, the state issued a check for 355,000 dollars (the amount of
the original jury verdict with no addition for detention damages). This
check was paid to Wolf on May 26, 1960. On May 2, 1961, on appeal by
the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
decision.
The supreme court, consistent with prior decisions,8 continued to
recognize a distinction between detention damages and interest on a debt.9
"Interest as such is recoverable only where there is a failure to pay a
liquidated sum due on a fixed day. . .. "10 Until the value of the property
taken by the state for public use is ascertained, or liquidated, there is no
fixed sum upon which interest can run. There is, therefore, a non-interest
bearing period of time between the taking of property in an eminent domain
proceeding and the final determination of the value of the property, at which
time interest on the ascertained sum begins to accrue.
To fill in this time gap, the courts have created a new term-detention
damages." In determining by legal proceedings the amount of the debt due
for the taking, damages for delay in payment are a proper element.' 2 Such
damages are not interest payments.' 3 The court, in Whitcomb v. Philadel-
phia,14 clearly expressed this distinction when it stated:
7. See Wolf v. Commonwealth, supra note 1, at 501, 170 A.2d at 559.
8. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 352 Pa.
143, 42 A.2d 585 (1945) ; Whitcomb v. Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 277, 107 Atl. 765 (1919).
9. However, the court altered the normal application of such a distinction. The
court computed detention damages to the time of the judgment whereas, in previous
decisions, it had computed such damages only to the time of the jury's verdict. The
court stated as its reason for allowing detention damages to be computed to the time
of the judgment to be that it had "remolded" the jury's verdict. By the definition of
,detention damages, such damages run until the value of the property taken is ascertained.
In the present case, the court reasoned, this value could not be considered ascertained
until the entire amount owing was made definite. Such definiteness was not available
until the final decision of the court (the court's handing down of its judgment n.o.v.,
"remolding" the jury's verdict), a point three and one-half months after the verdict.
However, the lower court did not change in any way the jury's determination of the
value of the land, leaving that figure at $355,000. The value of the land was definite
as of the time of the jury's verdict. Therefore, the court's time of "ascertainment" seems
questionable.
10. Richards v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co., 130 Pa. 37, 39, 18 Atl. 600 (1889),
,states :
Interest as such is recoverable only where there is a failure to pay a
liquidated sum due at a fixed day, and the debtor is in absolute default. It
cannot, therefore, be recovered . . . in actions of any kind where the damages
are not in their nature capable of exact computation, both as to time and
amount. In such cases the party chargeable cannot pay or make tender until
both the time and the amount have been ascertained, and his default is not
therefore of that absolute nature that necessarily involves interest for the delay.
11. Supra note 8.
12. Ibid.
13. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 352 Pa. 143, 42 A.2d 585
(1945).
14. Supra note 8.
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When land is taken under the power of eminent domain, the
owner thereof acquires the right to its value immediately upon
appropriation. Until that value has been definitely ascertained, it
is called damages, not a debt due; but when ascertained it relates
back to the time of taking, and the owner is entitled to compensation
for delay in its payment, unless just cause be shown to the contrary. 15
By employing the detention damages theory, the courts had found a
way to apply what in effect was an interest rate'" to a portion of the time
period during which payment was delayed. At the same time, they had not
overthrown the state's immunity from the payment of "interest."
The authority for the payment of any amount in excess of the actual
value of the land taken in eminent domain proceedings is derived from the
constitutional mandate:17 "Nor shall private property be taken or applied
to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being
first made or secured." "Just compensation" is usually interpreted as being
the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken, so that the
owner will be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have been
in had his property not been taken.' 8 This amount includes not only the
value of the property at the date of the taking, but, whenever the taking
precedes payment, compensation for the delay in payment. 19 The reason
for this is that, if the prior owner of the property had been paid for his land
at the time of the taking, he could, and presumably would, have invested
this money immediately. The interest he would have received on his invest-
ment is lost if he is not paid at the time of the taking. It is this loss of
interest which must be compensated by allowing an amount to be charged
for the delay in payment in order to make him whole.
Prior to the Wolf decision, the state as condemnor had been held immune
from the payment of interest.20 The courts reasoned that:
15. Id. at 284, 107 Atl. at 767.
16. The court stated:
This rate will be the normal commercial rate during the period of detention.
If no evidence is given as to that rate, the presumption is that the legal rate
was in effect. Ibid.
Black's Law Dictionary defines legal rate of interest as "that rate of interest prescribed
by the laws of the particular state . . . as the highest which may be lawfully con-
tracted for or exacted, and which must be paid in all cases where the law allows interest
without the assent of the debtor."
The normal commercial rate of interest is that which is charged by lenders to
the average, normal borrower whose credit is not "prime" or unquestionable. Lehigh
Valley Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 401 Pa. 135, 163 A.2d 86 (1960).
The court in this case would not allow a rate of 4% rather than 6% to be applied. This
4% rate was originally applied by the jury because there was a stipulation by the
parties that the prime commercial rate was 4%. The court held that no evidence was
produced to show that this was the normal commercial rate.
17. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
18. U.S.C.A., U.S. CONST. amend. V, comments thereto (1961).
19. United States v. Baugh, 149 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1945).
20. Supra note 4.
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Interest, as between individuals, is recoverable under usage
of trade, contract or statute. The theory on which interest is al-
lowed, except in cases of contract to pay interest, is that it is
damages for delay or default in payment by the debtor, measured
by a rate per cent. The State is not liable to pay interest on its debts
unless bound by statute or by contract of its executive officers. The
government is presumed always ready to pay, and it would be
against public policy to declare it otherwise.
21
This result as to interest payments had been upheld despite a statute
specifically dealing with the payment of interest in eminent domain proceed-
ings, which provides:
The amount of damages allowed in a report of viewers for the
taking, injury or destruction of property by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain shall, as finally confirmed, bear interest
at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date of the filing
of the report.
22
In Culver v. Commonwealth,23 this statute was avoided on the theory that
such statutes do not apply to the sovereign unless the sovereign is included
specifically by name or designation.
2 4
Thus, there are two diametrically opposed rights-the right of the
individual to be justly compensated and the implied right of the state to be
free from the payment of interest on its debts. The courts, as was stated
previously, prior to the Wolf decision, favored the state's immunity from
interest payments. However, they did so only to a limited extent, managing
at least partially to have the individual land owner "justly compensated."
They accomplished this by means of the distinction between detention dam-
ages and interest on a debt, maintaining that while "interest" could not be
charged against the state, detention damages could. The courts further limited
the scope of this sovereign immunity by considering only the state itself as
being entitled to such immunity. Instrumentalities of the state, carrying on
the state's purposes but created as entities separate from the state govern-
ment, were held not to be entitled to such immunity. In Lichtenstein v.
21. Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 276 Pa. 12, 14, 119 Atl. 723 (1923).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 43 (1958).
23. Supra note 4.
24. The court cited the following as its authority for refusing to apply the statute
in this fact situation:
In Tunison v. Commonwealth (347 Pa. 76, 78, 31 A.2d 521) we said
(p. 78) : ". . . it is axiomatic that a statute is never presumed to deprive the
state of any prerogative, right or property unless the intention to do so is
clearly manifest, either by express terms or necessary implication. Baker et al.
v. Kirschnek et al., 317 Pa. 225; Commonwealth v. Trunk et al., 320 Pa. 270;
see 59 C.J. 1103, § 653." The Act of 1929, as amended [supra note 22], does
not specifically mention the Commonwealth nor does it indicate any intendment
on the part of the legislature to deprive the State of its nonliability for the pay-
ment of interest on its obligations. (Emphasis the court's.)
[Vol. 66
RECENT CASES
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n,25 the court, although recognizing the
Culver rationale as to the Commonwealth's freedom from liability for inter-
est, held the commission liable for interest in eminent domain proceedings.
The trend towards limiting the state's immunity from interest pay-
ments has culminated, in the Wolf decision, in the virtual extinction of that
sovereign privilege, at least so far as condemnation awards are concerned.
The Wolf decision might be qualified to the extent that interest on the judg-
ment will be paid only where the period of time from the taking of the
property to the date of receipt of final payment has been unduly extended
for reasons not attributable to the fault of the condemnee. 26 One possible
reason for the court's allowing interest to be charged against the state in
this particular case is that the state retained the check for two months after
the check was issued 2 7 which in itself was after the trial, verdict and judg-
ment n.o.v. However, it is doubtful that the court ordered the state to pay
interest on the judgment solely because of such unwarranted delay in paying
the amount determined to be due. The majority of the court stated that the
payment of interest was not an unreasonable burden to impose upon the
state since it could protect itself by paying into court a substantial portion
of the value of the property at the time of the taking.28 The state would thus
avoid paying detention damages and interest on the amount paid into court.
29
The court's position is indicative of a desire to undermine such unwarranted
delay in payment as occurred in the Wolf case, so as to prevent any loss to
the owner of the land caused by such a delay.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has abrogated sovereign immunity
in the payment of interest in eminent domain proceedings. It is important
to consider this decision in the light of the arguments raised in the past for
25. 398 Pa. 415, 420, 158 A.2d 461, 463 (1960). In discussing the liabilities of
the Turnpike Commission, the court stated:
But, it would be carrying this particular immunity beyond justifiable limits
to extend it to an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, created for the per-
formance of an essential governmental function, where liability for the principal
sum involved resulted from the appropriation by the instrumentality, under its
power of eminent domain, of private property for use in the furtherance of the
public purpose for which the instrumentality was created. Indeed, it might well
be questioned whether the legislature could constitutionally deprive a property
owner of interest for delay in a condemnor's payment of an award made for
property so taken.
26. See note 1 supra, at 505, 170 A.2d at 561.
27. See Brief for Appellee, p. 18, Wolf v. Commonwealth, supra note 1.
28. Supra note 1, at 507, 107 A.2d at 562. The full quotation, found in footnote 7,
states:
The Commonwealth can protect itself by paying into court a substantial
amount of the value of the property at the time of its taking as reflected by the
opinions and valuations placed on such property by real estate experts selected
by the Commonwealth and thus can decrease the detention damages or interest
which it may eventually have to pay.
29. Oliphant v. Frost, 9 Pa. 308 (1848)
A fund in court does not bear interest [chargeable to the obligor]. If the
obligor was ready with the money when called for, it was all they could ask.
1962]
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maintaining the immunity. The Pennsylvania Constitution ° calls for "just
compensation to be first made or secured." The majority in the Wolf case
seems to consider the word "secured" to mean that the money must be paid
into court.
Such an interpretation of "secured" flies in the face of one of the argu-
ments which had supported the state's immunity in the past-the public faith
or credit theory.31 Under this theory the money, being held as state funds,
is as secure as if it had been paid into court. Although it has not as yet been
specifically set aside to pay a particular landowner for the taking of his prop-
erty, it is available and is certain to be paid.
The obvious rebuttal to this argument is that the state's holding the
money is not equivalent to the court's holding it because, if paid into court,
the money could earn interest to the benefit of the landowner. The land-
owner could thus be compensated for the time during which he had neither
his land nor the money value thereof. The applicable statute32 provides:
In all cases where money arising from any source shall be paid
into court, it shall be the duty of the said court, upon application
of any party appearing by the record prima facie entitled to said
fund, to order the same to be invested pendente lite in the debt of
the United States, or some other sufficient security, subject to the
decree of the court.
8
It is apparent that if such money were invested in United States bonds or
some other reliable security, earnings thereon would probably not exceed
three or four per cent. In view of this fact, it appears rather anomalous
that the state should have to pay six per cent interest on such money al-
though it is as secure in the state's treasury as it would be if paid into court.
3 4
If the risk of non-payment is equivalent in both cases, the difference in the
interest rate seems more attributable to a technical application of the rules
of judicial proof than to sound reason.35
Furthermore, the court has overlooked the constitutional arguments
30. Supra note 17.
31. See In re Spier Aircraft Corp., 137 F.2d 736, 740 (3d Cir. 1943).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 621 (1953).
33. Note that the fund paid into court does not automatically earn interest. The
court must receive an application by the party prima facie entitled to the fund (see
County Treasurer's Appeal, 8 Erie 83, 40 York 47 (Pa. 1926)). The party so entitled
may also request that the fund be paid over to him before the exact amount due him is
determined. The reason for this is that the money paid into the court becomes the
absolute property of the landowner: see 15 Stand. Pa. Practice, Tender § 25 (1939).
34. The reason for this seems to be that interest, although in effect it compensates
the landowner for the use of his money, is considered, as it was in Whitcomb v.
Philadelphia, supra note 8, a charge for wrongfully withholding money. The amount
owed is considered as having been loaned to the state and the state must pay the com-
mercial rate of interest on this loan, this being, without evidence to the contrary, 6%.
35. See notes 16 and 34, supra.
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presented for the proposition that the state is immune from the payment of
interest on its debts. Such an immunity has, in the past, been implied from
two articles of the Pennsylvania Constitution. One states that "suits may
be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and
in such cases as the legislature may by law direct."'3 6 (Emphasis added.)
From this wording it has been reasoned that it is for the state and not the
courts to decide to what extent the state may be sued and for what pay-
ments it will be liable. The other article of the constitution which has been
considered applicable prescribes that "no money shall be paid out of the
treasury except upon appropriations made by law, and on warrant by the
proper officer in pursuance thereof."37 The legislature does not appropriate
monies to pay interest on its debts and the courts do not have the power to
order the legislature to make such appropriations.
However, in a period when the state is making vast public improve-
ments, it frequently finds it necessary to take property under its power of
eminent domain. The need for judicial protection of the individual's rights
in such times is thus heightened. The landowner can do little to protect
himself in such a situation. The state, however, can protect both the in-
dividual and itself by paying into court the estimated value of the land
condemned. This would substantially avoid both detention damages and
the payment of interest 38 upon final determination of the value of the prop-
erty and, at the same time, fully compensate the owner of the land for the
loss of such land. The courts' allowance of a reasonable time for the state
to appropriate money from the legislature89 to pay such estimate will protect
the state from paying any amount over the actual value of the land taken so
long as it acts with reasonable promptness. The Wolf case thus stands as a
necessary and desirable judicial safeguard against the state's yielding to the
temptation to ignore the right of an individual to "just compensation" for
the taking of his property.
GERALD J. BATT
36. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
37. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 16.
38. Except for the desirability of maintaining consistency with the judicial concept
of interest (see note 10, supra), the Wolf decision has obviated the necessity for retain-
ing a distinction, in such cases, between "detention damages" and "interest." The com-
bined effect of the two is equivalent to compound interest being charged from the date
of the taking to the satisfaction of the judgment.
39. According to the Record, p. la, Wolf v. Commonwealth, supra note 1, the
Commonwealth had appropriated monies for condemning these and all other properties
in the area for the building of the Independence Mall.
1962]
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In the recent case of Dreer's Estate,' the decedent, a citizen of Pennsyl-
vania but domiciled in France at the time of her death, 2 devised certain
movable property to a legatee that predeceased her. The testatrix was sur-
vived by her brother's adopted child. This situation presented the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania with the issue of whether the child, legally adopted
in Pennsylvania, could under French law take an intestate share of the
movable property. In resolving this issue, the supreme court chose to adopt
the opinion -of the orphans' court. The basis of the decision was founded on
an established conflict-of-laws rule whereby succession to movable property
is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile.3 Applying French law
the orphans' court decided that the property must be distributed by intestate
shares, 4 and the adopted child could not take part in the distribution.5 Had
Pennsylvania law been held to govern the child would have been entitled to
her share."
Dreer's Estate presented the supreme court with a conflict-of-laws prob-
lem which might have been resolved by the use of renvoi.7 The context of
this doctrine is that whenever the forum is referred to the law of another
jurisdiction, it should consider not only the internal laws of that jurisdiction,
but in addition that jurisdiction's conflict-of-laws rules. 8 This would result
in another reference, whereby the forum might be directed to the law of a
third jurisdiction, 9 or, as in Dreer's Estate, since application of French con-
1. In Re Dreer's Estate, 22 D.&C.2d 737 (Pa. 1960), aff'd inem., 404 Pa. 368,
173 A.2d 102 (1961).
2. This was decided in an earlier proceeding before the Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia involving inheritance tax liability. Dreer Estate, 18 D.&C.2d 467 (Pa. 1959).
3. In Re Dreer's Estate, supra note 1, at 738, 173 A.2d at 104; see also Orcutt's
Appeal, 97 Pa. 179 (1881).
4. There is no anti-lapse statute in French law. In Re Dreer's Estate, supra note 1,
at 738, 173 A.2d at 104.
5. Id. at 379, 173 A.2d at 105-06.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §_ 1.8 (1950) ; In Re Finegan's Estate, 30 Erie 292 (Pa.
1948).
7. Renvoi is the French word for refer back, the doctrine having originated in
Europe. Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in
the Conflict of Laws, 14 So. 'CAL. L. REV. 221, at 249 (1941).
8. Schreiber has more precisely stated the issue involved:
When the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign
law for decision, is the reference to the corresponding rule of the conflict of
laws of that foreign law, or is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of that foreign law, minus its conflict-of-laws rules?
Schreiber, The Doctrine of Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 HARV. L. REV. 523, at
525 (1918).
9. For a clearer understanding of the doctrine, Lorenzen uses the terms "remis-
sion" (when the reference is back to the court of the forum) and "transmission" (when
the reference is to a third jurisdiction). Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict
of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 YALE L.J. 509, 518 (1918).
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flict rules would make reference to Pennsylvania, 0 back to the law of the
forum. The orphans' court in deciding the Dreer case chose to apply only
the substantive law of France, ignoring the French conflict-of-laws rules.
This Note will consider the propriety of using the renvoi doctrine in this case.
Generally, it may be stated that the purpose of renvoi is to achieve two
desirable results. Its first objective is the attainment of uniform judicial
determinations," irrespective of whether it is the foreign or domestic juris-
diction which is the forum. To illustrate, assume that jurisdiction A and
jurisdiction B, having divergent conflict rules, are called upon to administer the
same estate. Court A following its conflict rule would apply the substantive
law of B. Court B by the use of renvoi would also follow A's conflict rule
and therefQre apply its own law. Had jurisdiction B rejected renvoi and
applied the substantive law of A, different results would have been reached,
causing the estate to pass piecemeal rather than as a unit. Divergent results
also permit "forum shopping," i.e., the choosing of a forum which will render
a favorable determination. Renvoi's second objective is to enable the forum,
through the application of their own more familiar substantive law, to reach
accurate decisions with seemingly greater ease; and, in so doing, also per-
mitting the forum consistently to consider its own conflicts rule dictating
reference to the foreign law.
Thus far in this country renvoi has been predominantly an academic
theory, widely discussed by legal scholars, but having received little judicial
acceptance. The only Pennsylvania case considering the problem is Matter
of Baird,1 2 which involved a citizen of Pennsylvania who died domiciled in
France. The form of decedent's last will satisfied the requirements of the
state of its execution, New York, but was lacking so far as domestic French
law was concerned. In the will contest which resulted, it was determined
that the law of decedent's domicile was controlling. The court, in resorting
to French law, applied France's conflicts rule which provides that a
foreigner's will is valid if it conforms to the law of the place of its making.
The will's validity was thus recognized. In so deciding, the court chose not
10. France also governs the succession of movable property by the law of the
domicile, FRENCH CIVIL CODE, Art. 59 (1960). But this concept of domicile is much
different from the Anglo-American concept. French law considers a person's legal
place of establishment as his domicile. Id. Art. 102. Aliens desiring to acquire a French
domicile- under French law must comply with certain police regulations, Ordonnance of
Nov. 2, 1945. Decedent here stated in her will that Philadelphia was her legal residence,
Dreer Estate, supra note 2, at 468. The French courts would probably rule that the
decedent's domicile was Pennsylvania. See generally Delaume, A Codification of French
Private International Law, 29 CAN. B. REv. 721 (1951) ; Lorenzen, The French Rules
of the Conflict of Laws, 36 YALE L.J. 731, at 733 (1927).
11. 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 94 (2d. ed. 1958).
12. Orphans' Ct. of Philadelphia, July 18, 1916.
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to mention renvoi, although it seemingly applied the doctrine.'x Alternatively,
however, it has been suggested that this decision may simply be an example
of the court's indulgent treatment of wills in point of formalities. 14 The
only American jurisdiction'6 having clearly accepted renvoi is New York.16
England has also adopted renvoi, applying it to cases of succession to movable
property. 17 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws rejects the doctrine,'
except in cases involving the validity of divorces and title to real property.' 9
The main criticism of renvoi is that it is unfounded in point of logical
reasoning. To illustrate, assume that in a fact situation similar to the Dreer
case, the forum accepts renvoi, and resorts to the foreign court's conflict-
of-laws rule which refers the matter back to the law of the forum. If the
first reference is to the foreign jurisdiction's conflicts laws, should not the
second reference (back to the forum) be to the forum's conflict-of-laws rules,
resuming the journey once more? In such a situation the courts would
obviously flounder in an endless chain of references. 2° This logical incon-
sistency has caused many writers to reject renvoi.21
However, three theories, based on practical urgency rather than logical
reasoning, are available to avoid the ad infinitum series of references. The
first, denoted the "jump off" rationale, causes the courts' second reference
to be exclusively to the internal law. The proponents 22 of this "escape
13. This would appear to be an application of the "transmission" type of renvoi,
see supra note 9.
14. Falconbridge, Renvoi in New York and Elsewhere, 6 VAND. L. REv. 708,
738 (1953).
15. The American decisions on renvoi have been extensively reviewed in Abbot,
Is the Renvoi a Part of the Common Law?, 24 L.Q. REv. 133 (1908); Falconbridge,
supra note 14; Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10
COLUM. L. REv. 190, 327 (1910) ; Schreiber, supra note 8.
16. In Re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1950), aff'd,
100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1950). This suit concerned the validity of a will devising certain
real property located in Switzerland. The testator was a citizen of the United States
and died domiciled in New York. The will was contested because of not conforming
to the law of the situs of the property, or Switzerland. Deciding that the Swiss courts
would apply New York law to this case, the New York court accepted the reference
and upheld the will as conforming to New York law. This case involves the distribu-
tion of real property and can be distinguished from the Dreer case.
17. See, e.g., Re Duke of Wellington [1947] 1 Ch. 506; Re Annesley [1926)
1 Ch. 692.
18. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7, Comment b (1934).
19. Id. § 8.
20. This dilemma has been variously described as a "game of international lawn
tennis," BuzzATI, IL. RINViO 77 (1898); a "circulus inextrabilis," In Re Tallmadge,
109 Misc. 696, 712, 181 N.Y. Supp. 336, 346 (1919); and a "merry-go-round,"
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1938).
21. See, e.g., BATY, POLARIZED LAW 117 (1914); Cormack, supra note 7; Falcon-
bridge, Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile, 19 CAN. B. REV. 311 (1941); Lorenzen,
supra note 9; Pollock, The Renvoi in New York, 36 L.Q. REv. 92 (1920); Schreiber,
supra note 8.
22. BRESLAUER, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SUCCESSION 16 (1937); Morris,
[Vol. 66
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device" recognize the inconsistency of stopping after the second reference,
but they maintain that to reject renvoi entirely is even more unjustified. But
were this theory to be applied in Dreer's Estate, an added stigma would be
present. France evidently has adopted renvoi,23 hence specifically directing
the Pennsylvania court on the second reference to consider the Pennsyl-
vania conflict-of-laws rules, forcing the court to return to the endless circle.
To escape, the court must ignore the renvoi rule of France; but, to do so is
to inaccurately apply French law. Thus, the result would be multiple in-
consistent reasoning and apparent disregard of its own conflicts rule that
the applicable law is that of the domicile. However, an even greater weakness is
present. If the Pennsylvania court had adopted this theory, France having
previously accepted renvoi, the stated purpose of uniform judicial determi-
nations would be unsatisfied because the final reference of both jurisdictions
would be to their respective internal law.
A second view is advanced mainly by Westlake2 4 and von Bar,25 who
favor the result attained by renvoi, but who also realize that the endless
circle cannot be avoided. This rationale, termed the d~sistement theory,
supposes a mutual disclaimer of jurisdiction by both courts, resulting in the
application of the internal law of the forum. Thus, when Pennsylvania has
determined the domicile to be France, but France has declined to accept
this conclusion stating that the domicile is Pennsylvania, both have dis-
claimed jurisdiction; and, in the absence of any law to be applied the law
of the forum must suffice. This proposal has not been widely accepted.2 6
Much like the "jump off" theory, d6sistement is contrary to renvoi's main
objective of uniform solutions as it always results in the application of the
law of the forum.
The final and most widely accepted theory is designated "total renvoi.
''27
This proposal directs the forum to resolve the issue precisely as would the
The Law of the Domicile, 18 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 32, 33 (1937); one writer maintains
that the "jump off" theory is not illogical: Cowan, Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical
Fallacy, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 34 (1938).
23. The first court ever to apply renvoi was the Cour de Cassation, France's
highest appellate court. Affaire Forgo [1883] clunet 64. The principle of stare decisis
is not adhered to in France, but other French courts have followed this decision to
such an extent that one writer states that there is a "jurisprudence constante" on this
matter, Falconbridge, Renvoi and Succession to Movables: 2, 47 L.Q. REV. 271, 277
(1931).
24. WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 30-31 (7th ed. 1925).
25. Von Bar, 18 Annvaire de L'Institut de Droit International 153-57 (1900).
26. See, e.g., Lorenzen, supra note 9, at 516; Schreiber, supra note 8, at 532;
Abbot, supra note 15, at 137.
27. This term is used by Falconbridge in Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile,
19 CAN. B. REV. 311, 313 (1941). He considers this theory to be the only one with "a
certain measure of coherency." Id. at 315.
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foreign court to which reference is made. Griswold,2 in summarizing this
view, stated:
If a French court would apply French "internal law" (either be-
cause it "accepts the renvoi" or for any other reason), then the
[Pennsylvania] . . . court should apply French "internal law." If
the French court would apply [Pennsylvania] . . . "internal law"
(either because it "rejects the renvoi" or for any other reason)
then the [Pennsylvania] . .. court should apply [Pennsylvania] ...
"internal law." If the French court would apply Chinese "internal
law" the [Pennsylvania] . . . court should do the same.2
Total renvoi is the doctrinal form adopted by most English cases.8 0
But despite its comparative success, total renvoi can not always avoid the
endless circle. If both the French and Pennsylvania courts adopted this view
a solution in Dreer's Estate would be very difficult. The Pennsylvania court,
in attempting to resolve the issues exactly as would a French court, would
find that the latter would be directed to decide the case precisely as would
the former. Adoption of total renvoi by both conflicting jurisdictions can
result only in an impasse. Its universal adoption will defeat it completely-
quite a peculiarity for a rule of private international law. Griswold recog-
nized this weakness, 31 but brushed it aside as arising "only infrequently.
'8 2
He stated, "In such a case there might be reason for disposing of the case
according to our own [the forum's] internal law."1
33
It is submitted, however, that total renvoi if adopted by Pennsylvania
would be effective only in exceptional cases. It can not be availed of when
the foreign jurisdiction involved is England or any other jurisdiction that
subsequently adopts total renvoi. Generally, within the United States, no
conflict will arise concerning succession to movables since all the states agree
that the law of the domicile shall prevail; and their interpretation of domicile
is uniform, except for certain peculiarities in the law of Louisiana.
34
In respect to other foreign jurisdictions, many complications arise which
make the use of total renvoi extremely difficult. Those courts, not recog-
nizing the domicile principle in deciding succession to movables, usually
hold that distribution is decided by the law of the nationality. 35 Thus, on
the reference back, the Pennsylvania court is directed to apply the law of
28. Professor Griswold is acknowledged as a leading American "advocate of the
doctrine." Cormack, supra note 7, at 254.
29. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (1938).
30. See, e.g., In Re Askew, [1930] 2 Ch. 259; see also supra note 17.
31. Griswold, supra note 29, at 1169.
32. Id. at 1192.
33. Id. at 1193.
34. 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 145.
35. Id. at 117-29.
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the decedent's nationality. But since there is no federal law covering descent,
a reference to the national law of a citizen of the United States would be
ineffective. The court would somehow have to fictionalize a reference to
the law of a particular state.
86
Any court adopting renvoi, regardless of the view accepted, will also
encounter many practical difficulties. For example, in order for the forum
to refer back to its own internal law, it must first interpret the conflict-of-
laws rules of the foreign jurisdiction. These principles will be unfamiliar to
the court and perhaps be more complicated than the internal laws considered
if renvoi is rejected. Hence there is greater chance that the court will be
misinformed and that a miscarriage of justice will occur. In addition, attor-
neys will have greater difficulty in correctly advising their clients, thus
promoting increased litigation.
Despite these practical adversities, if renvoi were to effectuate uniformity
of distribution its use might be warranted. However, as Cook suggests,
since the forum court may at best hazard a guess as to the manner in which
the foreign court would decide the case, "it may well be that the attempt to
secure uniformity of distribution of a decedent's movables should be
abandoned as probably impossible of attainment. '8 7 But there are other
problems. Latent conflicts between the two jurisdictions in their basic
characterization of the question3" or differences in their procedural rules
3 9
may lead them to diverse results. Furthermore, the public policy of either
the forum or foreign courts may prevent their giving effect to the foreign
law. For example, on the facts of the Dreer case both courts might by the
use of renvoi resolve that the Pennsylvania intestate laws allowing an
adopted child to share 40 are applicable. However, the French judge might
also conclude that to do so would violate the French policy of "forced heir-
ship."'4 1 Moreover, since French public policy can be decided only on a
case to case basis by French judges, foreign courts could not possibly deter-
mine such questions accurately.
While the supreme court in the Dreer case might well have discussed
renvoi, their non-application of the doctrine was seemingly the wiser course.
Uniformity of decision and distribution is a desirable result, but, as Lorenzen
points out, "[such] cannot be obtained until the elimination of the differences
in the systems of Private International Law through international agree-
36. A complete discussion of this problem is found in Falconbridge, supra note 14,
at 721.
37. Coox, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 242 (1941).
38. See generally Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification or Characterization
Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (1941).
39. See generally CooK, op. cit. supra note 37, at 166.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.8 (1950).
41. See In Re Dreer's Estate, supra note 1, at 748, 173 A.2d at 109 (1961).
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ment."4 2 In view of the difficulties of attaining uniformity, perhaps a more
realistic objective would be a degree of certainty in this field 4 3 -and certainty
can be best attained if the reference to the law of the domicile is always to
their internal law, excluding completely their conflicts laws. However, renvoi's
failure to attain uniformity in this case should not suggest that the doctrine
be rejected in all instances. Many of renvoi's severest critics recognize that
there are some situations in which the doctrine should be applied.
4 4
CHARLES B. ZWALLY
42. Lorenzen, supra note 15, at 206.
43. Suggested by CooK, op. cit. supra note 37, at 432.
44. See, e.g., Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue
Based on Faulty Analysis, 27 YALE L.J. 193 (1917); Falconbridge, Renvoi, Charac-
terization and Acquired Rights, 17 CAN. B. REv. 369 (1939).
